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Death at Licourt 
An Historical and Visual Record of 
Five Fatalities in the 1st Canadian 
Motor Machine Gun Brigade, 25 
March 1918 
Cameron Pulsifer 
M ajor William Bat te r sby , commander of "A" Battery of the 
1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun 
Brigade, waited anxiously at Cizancourt 
on the west bank of the Somme Canal 
in France as the sky cleared in the early 
morning of 25 March 1918. The great 
"Kaiser's Offensive," by which the 
German high command hoped it would 
smash the Allies and win the war, had been 
battering away at the British Third and Fifth 
Armies in this region for six days. Battersby had 
come forward with "A" Battery's four armoured 
Autocars from the Brit ish 24th Brigade 
Headquarters around at 0400 hours to be in 
position to support a British counterattack 
scheduled for 0815 hours. Instead, masses of 
German attackers were now pouring across the 
canal. 
German art i l lery b o m b a r d m e n t had 
increased in intensity and as the dawn broke 
and the early morning mists dissipated, 
Battersby saw clearly that enemy infantry were 
already well established on his side of the canal 
and were pressing forward all around him. 
Meanwhile, parties of nearly panicking British 
infantry stumbled rearwards towards their lines, 
making it clear that a British retreat was in 
process, not an offensive. Battersby had no 
choice but to order his cars to get out of the 
area, along the road they had come that morning. 
One car, which had remained farther back, 
succeeded in getting away with relatively few 
difficultuies. But the three others, which had 
advanced closest to the canal, had no 
time even to turn around and were 
forced to back down the road in column. 
Battersby's car was the last to leave and 
hence the closest to the enemy assault. 
Inside were Battersby, 36 years old, 
from Tavistock, Ontario, sitting in the 
cab beside his driver, Private Robert 
Connell 24 years old, from Toronto. 
Behind them, in the rear of the vehicle, were 
Sergeant Cyrill Vidal, 26 years old, from Jamaica 
and two machine gunners, Private John Begin, 
26 years old, from Hamilton, Ontario and Private 
Donald Brooks, 20 years old, of Weymouth, Nova 
Scotia. They would not make it, their names 
being added to the seemingly endless list of First 
World War fatalities. 
Battlefield death lies at the heart of war. Yet 
one would not necessarily know it from the visual 
record. Scenes of actual battlefield death are 
quite rare, perhaps especially so in the case of 
Canadian soldiers. To be sure, no nation has 
been especially zealous about publishing visual 
depictions of its battlefield casualties while the 
war was in progess, doubtless for reasons of 
national morale and the sensibilities of surviving 
family. Why more have not appeared since, 
however, when morale is no longer an issue and 
immediate family members have died, is an 
interesting question. One might well argue that 
the relative absence of dead and wounded from 
the visual record of our wars is a serious 
omission, which seriously distorts the depiction 
of our military experience. Historian Victor Davis 
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Hanson has recently argued: "Euphemism in 
battle narrative or the omission of graphic killing 
is a near capital offense of the military 
historian."1 
During the First World War, Sir Max Aitken, 
later Lord Beaverbrook, founded the Canadian 
War Records Office to create a documentary and 
visual record of Canada's involvement in the war. 
But, as Peter Robertson of the National Archives 
of Canada has shown, the line between the use 
of the images as historical records and as agents 
of propaganda was a very thin one indeed. 
Captain Harry Knobel, for example, the first 
photographer employed by Aitken, recorded that 
during an exhibition of his photographs held in 
London in 1916, the only thing that upset his 
boss was the fact that the body of a dead German 
had been covered up before being photographed. 
"Cover up the Canadians before you photograph 
them as much as you like," commented Sir Max, 
"but don't bother about the German dead."2 
Robertson's own summation of the photography 
produced under Aitken's Canadian War Records 
Office scheme is that: 
Although there are occasional photographs 
which convey the real horror of war in a graphic 
manner. . . , the majority of the photographs 
present the official Allied version of events: the 
50 
A armoured car of the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun 
Brigade. 
unfailing cheerfulness of the British Tommy, the 
minimilization of Allied losses, the belief in the 
inevitability of an Allied victory.3 
Even the much-vaunted war art collection at the 
Canadian War Museum, also begun by Lord 
Beaverbrook, tends to eschew images of death 
and destruction, concentrating instead on scenes 
such as battlefield landscapes, troops preparing 
for battle, and daily routine. The major exception 
to this rule was future Group of Seven painter, 
Fred Varley, who, for his own reasons, in his 
painting For What?, actually did paint Canadian 
war dead.4 
In the Winter 2001 issue of this journal, I 
published an account of the operations of the 
innovative First World War Canadian armoured 
units, the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine 
Gun Brigades. This article focused most 
intensively on the services of these units in the 
last year of the war when, due to the presence of 
more mobile conditions of warfare than had 
prevailed during the pervious three years of 
relatively static trench fighting, they saw their 
most concentra ted period of operat ional 
activity.5 Although the article emphasized that 
the units took heavy casualties, this was not 
reflected in the accompanying illustrations. 
Instead, the images consist of standard official 
Canadian War Records Office photographs 
showing the cars either at rest within a vehicle 
compound or moving along roads, their crews 
smiling and apparently enthusiastic. The harsh 
reality of war was entirely absent. 
Not one of these photographs shows the cars 
under bombardment or, for that matter, emitting 
machine gun fire of their own against an enemy. 
None show the crews fighting for their lives. In 
particular, there are no after-action shots 
showing casualties. But since this first article 
appeared, three photos have come to light that 
fill the last of these gaps. They show Battesby's 
car with its dead crew inside only moments after 
they were killed. Significantly, they were taken 
not by Canadians but instead by the advancing 
Germans, eager no doubt to record their 
battlefield triumphs.6 
Although taken during a lull in the battle, 
these photos convey a sense of the fury and 
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 11 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol11/iss3/5
devastation that took place as well as the cold 
hard fact of death. The following will attempt to 
assess the documentary importance of these 
photographs by discussing the nature of the 
fighting that these men faced when, for the first 
time since 1914, warfare on the Western Front 
was again becoming mobile. This article will 
examine the precise historical circumstances 
that led to their deaths and the photographs 
being taken, and by providing the stories of the 
men who were killed. 
Tie last major German offensive of the war, the huge Kaiserschlacht, or "Imperial 
Battle," began in the spring of 1918. The 
Germans were determined to make one last 
attempt to knock the western Allies out of the 
war. Augmented by the addition of a large 
number of divisions transferred from the 
Eastern Front following the defeat of Russia, the 
Germans knew that the full might of the 
Americans was soon to be unleashed against 
them.7 Their first effort, operation "Michael," fell 
against the British Third and Fifth Armies in 
Picardy in front of the town of Amiens along the 
banks of the River Somme, where another huge 
battle had been waged two years earlier and yet 
another, the Battle of Amiens, was to be fought 
only four months later. Originating east of the 
German lines behind St. Quentin, the Somme 
meandered south-westwards through the 
German and British lines to the village of St. 
Simon, where it turned due west for a stretch 
until it reached the town of Ham. Here it turned 
north-northwest to flow on to Peronne, where it 
veered directly west to flow though Amiens. The 
most critical portion of the battle fought in March 
1918 was along the 24 kilometre stretch of river 
flowing between the towns of Ham and Peronne. 
Along the west side of the river between these 
two communities ran the Somme Canal, one of 
the region's principal waterways, which was 17 
metres wide and a couple of metres deep. The 
river, on the other hand, was only about 9 metres 
wide at this time of year and was easily fordable 
at some points as the water was so low.8 
The first blow fell with the opening of a huge 
German art i l lery b o m b a r d m e n t of high 
explosives and poison gas at 0440 hours on 21 
March 1918. The British had adopted the 
German system of defense in depth, with 
forward, battle and reserve zones. Unfortunately, 
they had misinterpreted the German doctrine 
and had too many men in the "forward" zone. 
These forces were cut off by the initial German 
assaults. Instead, they should have been in the 
"battle zone" further back, where they might have 
had time to react. Many units were decimated 
before the German infantry began to attack five 
hours later, led by special groups of storm 
troopers armed with light machine guns, light 
mortars, and flame-throwers. Using new tactics, 
they pushed the British back all along the front, 
surging as far forward as possible and flowing 
around pockets of resistance, leaving them 
behind to be cleared up later.9 Fifth Army, under 
General Sir Hubert Gough, held the front 
between Peronne and the River Oise south of 
Ham. It was spread too thin and its morale was 
still low from its experiences in the cauldron of 
Passchendaele, from whence it had been moved 
south only in January. It began to fall back in 
d i sa r ray and a German b r e a k t h r o u g h 
threatened. 
By the end of the first day, the Germans had 
captured more territory than the Allies had in 
140 days of fighting in the First Battle of the 
Somme two years earlier.10 The German attack 
resumed on 22 March with equal intensity and 
even greater success . The previous day's 
withdrawals having lengthened their front, many 
Fifth Army units found themselves isolated and 
deficient in mortars and machine guns, which 
they had lost in the initial assault. Inadequately 
trained in conducting withdrawals, units began 
to crumble before the German onslaught. In 
some areas the troops panicked and were only 
held in position by military police or an officer's 
pistol.11 
By 23 March, the Germans had pushed Fifth 
Army's left flank back almost to Peronne. By the 
morning of 24 March, the situation was growing 
more perilous by the hour. To the north, German 
troops were penetrating northwest of Peronne. 
On the Somme itself, between Peronne and Ham, 
they were massing on the east bank, searching 
for spots to cross. Indeed, around Ham and on 
the far right on the Oise they had forced a 
crossing and were advancing with such 
determination that a gap threatened to open 
between British forces to the north and French 
units to their south. This was the situation when 
the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade 
(1CMMGB) entered the seething tide of battle. 
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The 1CMMGB had just begun to emerge from 
a period of internal upheaval. In January 1918, 
its commander since the battle of Passchendaele 
in October-November 1917, Lieutenant-Colonel 
F.A. Wilkin, had been relieved of his command 
and sent back to England suffering from battle 
fatigue. In his place, temporary command was 
given to the unit 's next senior officer, the 
36-year-old Major William Battersby, MC. On 11 
March, the corps commander, Lieutenant-
General Sir Arthur Currie, inspected the unit at 
its headquarters in the village of Verdrel, close 
to Vimy Ridge. He was not impressed, noting 
that night in his diary: "Rode to Verdrel to inspect 
the Motor Machine Gun Brigade - found it bad."12 
Battersby's days as commander were clearly 
numbered. 
Five days later, Currie met with Brigadier-
General J .E.B. Seely, commander of the 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade, and the latter's 
subordinate, Major W.K. Walker, DSO, MC, the 
commander of the Cavalry Brigade's dismounted 
Machine Gun Squad ron . Walker had a 
reputat ion as a strict disciplinarian and 
impressed Currie, who decided he was the one 
to head the Motor Brigade. Six feet two inches 
tall, weighing over 200 pounds, and known to 
most most as "Tiny," Walker arrived at Verdrel 
to take command on 17 March with orders to 
tighten up discipline and reorganize. One of his 
first moves was to increase the number of 
batteries from four to five. The so-called "Sifton" 
Brigade, consist ing of the eight original 
armoured Autocars with which the unit had first 
come overseas, was split into two, designated 
"A" and "B" Batteries. The Eaton, Borden, and 
Yukon Batteries, which had joined later and 
carried their machine guns in light Napier 
trucks, were retitled "C," "D" and "E" Batteries. 
This reorganization had only jus t been 
implemented when, at 1500 hours on 22 March, 
Canadian Corps Operation Order No. 185 came 
through instruct ing the uni t "to proceed 
tomorrow to Amiens and come under the orders 
of Fifth Army."13 Walker later claimed that 
General Gough had got the idea of using his unit 
from Brigadier Seely who, with his Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade, was then serving under Gough 
in the area of the River Oise.14 Certainly British 
High Command was looking everywhere for 
reinforcements to be sent to the scene of the 
crisis. Three Australian Divisions and one from 
New Zealand were moved south from Flanders 
on 23 March and, on the same day, as a 
precautionary measure, 1st and 2nd Canadian 
Divisions were removed from Currie's command 
and placed, respectively, under First Army and 
General Headquarters Reserve. In the end, 
however, 1CMMGB was the only Canadian unit 
actually to move south.15 Seely's own cavalry was 
heavily engaged and it is possible that he 
considered this motorized unit would be an 
additional help in a battle where the trench lines 
had broken down and for the first time since 
1914 units were ranging widely over an open 
battlefield. 
The Brigade set off from Verdrel on the road 
trip to Amiens at 0530 hours the next morning, 
with a message from Currie pronouncing: "The 
Corps Commander wishes you the best of luck 
and has every confidence that you will do more 
than well."16 Preceded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Walker, driving in an open Vauxhall and then by 
the battery commanders in Fords, the procession 
consisted of the armoured cars of "A" and "B" 
Batteries, the Napier Light trucks of "C," "D," 
and "E" Batteries, equipped with two heavy 
Vickers machine guns each, plus 65 motorcycles 
for scouting, signalling, and communications 
duties.17 Also in the convoy were 20 3-ton lorries 
of the 2nd Canadian Ammunition Sub Park, 
which Currie had especially arranged to be 
at tached to enhance the expedition's self 
sufficiency. They were to prove invaluable over 
the coming days.18 Travelling south through 
numerous French villages, the procession made 
good time, arriving at Amiens at noon. Delays 
experienced there, however, meant that it did 
not reach Fifth Army Headquarters, only a short 
distance to the east at Villers Bretonneux, until 
1600 hours.19 
General Gough and his staff had arrived only 
that morning, after retreating 20 km westwards 
from the town of Nesle nearer the Somme, and 
much confusion prevailed. Walker was distinctly 
unimpressed, recalling later that "Villers 
Bretonneux was a maze of staff officers coming 
and going" who came "cheaper by the dozen." 
Upon requesting much-needed maps of the area, 
he was informed that they were "all packed up" 
and he had to appeal to Gough's chief-of-staff to 
get hold of them. He had only a brief meeting 
with Gough, whom he found "cool but showing 
immense strain." He thought the general could 
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have t aken a few m o m e n t s to speak to the 
recently arrived men of the Motors, bu t although 
he at first was going to do so, he changed his 
mind. "His army, like himself, was crumbling," 
commented Walker.20 
Walker emerged from his meetings at Villers 
Bretonneux with very general instruct ions tha t 
his uni t was to be employed "in filling gaps 
occurring at any point along the a rmy front".21 
British commanders made clear to h im their 
view tha t the "line of the River Somme between 
Ham and Peronne h a d to be held at all costs , 
and tha t should the enemy succeed in crossing 
the Somme, the s i tuat ion on Fifth Army front 
would be very serious."22 It was within a rough 
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triangle, with the line of the River Somme 
between these two communities as the base and 
Villers Bretonneux as the peak, that the Brigade 
was to see most of its action over the next two 
weeks. 
Establishing his own headquarters at Villers 
Bretonneux, Walker's first move was to send "D" 
and "E" Batteries under Captain H.F. Meurling 
s o u t h e a s t to Fifth Army's XVIII Corps 
Headquarters at Roye on the River Ancre, 37 
km to the west of Ham. Here they were given a 
hot meal and then sent about 10 km up the road 
northeastwards to Nesle, the site of Gough's 
former headquarters. Threading their way 
against thick traffic that was fleeing west, they 
did not reach Nesle until 0200 hours. 
A few hours after Meurling's detachment had 
left, Walker dispatched "B" and "C" Batteries, 
under Captain E.H. Holland, to the north to aid 
VII Corps on the left flank of Fifth Army to help 
stem a German advance on a passage of the 
Somme north of Peronne. They spent all night 
inching their away along the congested road and 
went into action immediately upon reaching the 
threatened point at the village of Clery at 0800 
hours on 24 March. A furious battle raged all 
day long, by the end of which all the officers and 
most of the rank and file of the two batteries 
were either dead or wounded. 
The Germans were now pressing hard all 
along the line of the River Somme. From the 
south, where they had crossed the previous day, 
they were advancing westwards and northwards 
against the right flank of XVIII Corps. By noon 
they had forced other crossings further north 
near Bethancourt. "D" and "E" Batteries were 
just to the southwest at Nesle, and at noon 
Meurling threw "D" Battery under Captain F.D. 
Harkness, MC, into a counterattack with the 
British 183rd Brigade in front of Bethancourt. 
The unit fought furiously throughout the early 
afternoon, suffering 50 percent casualties before 
withdrawing westwards. In one of only three 
references he makes to the presence of the 
Canadian Motors, the British official historian, 
Sir James Edmonds, noted that this attack held 
up the German advance in the area for about 
four hours.23 
In the meantime, "A" Battery under Major 
Bat te rsby remained beh ind at Villers 
Bretonneux. It was not until 1300 hours on the 
54 
24th, that they were at last sent forward to the 
headquarters of the British 24th Brigade, XIX 
Corps , a t Marchelepot . Reaching the i r 
destination late in the afternoon, the battery 
consisted of a number of motor cycle dispatch 
raiders plus four of the original Brutinel-
designed armoured Autocars, one commanded 
by Battersby himself, the others by Lieutenants 
W.H. Smith, W.G. Cuttle, and W.P. Adams. 
The make-up of the car's crews is less 
certain. On land, the operation of a Vickers 
machine guns was a labour-intensive process 
requiring a crew of six. The first carried the 
tripod, placed it in position, and operated the 
gun in action; the second carried the gun, placed 
it on its mount, and fed the belts during 
operation; the third kept a steady supply of 
ammunition flowing to the second, while the 
four th , fifth and s ixth carr ied extra 
ammunition.24 The armoured Autocars would 
not have required as many, as they were mobile 
and had their machine guns permanently fixed. 
They also carried their own supply of 10,000 
rounds of ammunition in special containers 
immediately beside the guns on the rear chassis, 
eliminating the need for the three ammunition 
carriers. As the number two man probably 
supplied the ammunition to the gun as well as 
fed the belts while number one fired, the 
standard crew for a single Vickers in an Autocar 
most likely would have been only two, the total 
crew, with driver, being five. This is certainly the 
number shown in official photographs of the cars 
in operation in Europe, the commander sitting 
forward with the driver.25 
At Marchelepot, Battersby and his officers 
met with 24th Brigade's commanding officer, 
Brigadier R.C. Haig (a cousin of Field Marshal 
Sir Douglas Haig), who described the main threat 
building on the banks of the Somme. The enemy 
was massing his forces on the east bank while 
constantly raking the British on the west bank 
with artillery and machine gun fire. Haig 
suspected that some had already crossed, as they 
indeed had in some places. Haig ordered 
Battersby to take two armoured cars 6 km east 
to the village of Cizancourt on the banks of the 
canal to appraise the situation and do what he 
could to stem enemy incursions. Major Battersby 
set off in command of one car and Lieutenant 
Cuttle in the other at 1730 hours. The cars 
possessed no cross-country capability and 
consequently had to take a road that ran about 
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Area of Operations: 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade 
24-25 March 1918 
3 km southeast to the village of Licourt and there 
turn left onto another that ran for a further 5 
km northeast to Cizancourt. 
At Cizancourt, they turned right and 
proceeded south down a road along the west 
bank of the canal towards the village of 
Epenancourt, which lay 5 km further south. 
Enemy aircraft were active over the front and 
just outside of Cizancourt one swooped down 
to attack them, but they drove it off with return 
machine gun fire. Soon afterwards, an officer of 
the British Sherwood Foresters Regiment came 
upon them and confirmed that the Germans 
were across the canal to the south. He urged 
Battersby to push his cars ahead to bring their 
twin Vickers to bear while his own unit attacked 
with Lewis guns. As he deemed the road too 
narrow for two cars to advance, Battersby and 
his crew went ahead alone. J u s t north of 
Epenancourt they encountered a column of 
German infantry advancing north in the brush 
beside the road and immediately opened up with 
their Vickers, causing the surprised enemy to 
scatter. The Germans were close enough to hurl 
a number of hand grenades at his car, but the 
explosions deflected off its armour and caused 
no injuries. The Canadians remained in position 
for three more hours, expending about 8000 
rounds of ammunition in raking the fields in 
front of Epenancourt and the opposite side of 
the canal. They then withdrew to rejoin Cuttle 
towards Cizancourt and proceeded back to 
Marchelepot to report to Brigadier Haig. One of 
Battersby's gun barrels was pierced but there 
were no casualties.26 He and his crew would not 
be so fortunate the next day. 
In a paper of the "Lessons Learned" from 
these days, Captain Meurling, commander of "D" 
and "E" Batteries, provides an interesting 
analysis of the conditions under which the 
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Canadian motor machine g u n n e r s operated in 
this, their first, mobile action of the war: 
The nature of the fighting - a more or less 
"running fight" with the M/Guns never retiring 
until outflanked - made it impossible for the 
officer to communicate with guns not In his 
immediate neighbourhood and the comparative 
[sic] large targets presented by the crews of more 
than two guns retiring simultaneously caused, 
where tried, large casualties.27 
The enemy screened themselves with h a n d -
thrown smoke-bombs , con t inued Meurling, 
behind which they advanced in small co lumns 
preceded by "large n u m b e r s of light machine 
g u n s . " When they e n c o u n t e r e d opposi t ion, 
especially from machine g u n s , they sen t up 
coloured flares to signal their artillery to open 
up. The flares also signalled the infantry to begin 
flanking a n d enveloping movements , which 
"nearly always compelled our machine guns to 
withdraw." 
Concealment is of primary importance. The 
enemy will not advance against Machine Gun 
Fire. As soon as he located the approximate 
position of our Batteries he worked around and 
outflanked them. 
If the enemy is massing within reasonable range 
fire should at once be opened up, if not, the 
opportunity of killing the enemy may be lost, 
owing to the working around in such a number 
as to deny a good field of fire.28 
The enemy also employed large n u m b e r s of 
snipers for this task, which, Meurling asserted, 
caused 50 per cent of Canadian casualt ies. 
As for the Canadian machine gunne r s ' own 
tactics, Meurling wrote tha t they were, 
of necessity very simple. They consisted simply 
in giving everybody as free a hand as possible to 
check the enemy wherever we could, inflicting 
as many casualties as we could and the only thing 
that rigorously was enforced was that no M/Gun 
was allowed to withdraw until outflanked and 
that communications with commanders must 
be kept up.29 
In a separa te a s sessmen t , Meurling also 
argued tha t the "Amoured cars should have a 
loop-hold [sic] turret." This he deemed essential 
to protect the gunners , who h a d to expose their 
head and upper body above the cars ' a rmour 
p l a t i n g wh i l e f i r ing t h e i r g u n s . H e a l s o 
recommended tha t the cars be equipped with 
double drive so tha t they could be driven into 
pos i t i on a n d t h e n w i t h d r a w n w i t h o u t t he 
necess i ty of back ing up or t u rn ing a round . 
Lacking s u c h a mechanism, drivers found the 
cars difficult to manoeuver on sunken roads and 
on steep hills. At the same time, he thought that 
the Vickers gunne r s should be t rained on the 
Lewis G u n as well, a n d t h a t the cars have 
a t tached either infantry or machine gunne r s 
equipped with rifles to protect against enemy 
snipers.3 0 
C a n a d i a n r epor t s some t imes expressed 
f r u s t r a t i o n wi th t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of the i r 
beleaguered British infantry colleagues. Even 
Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, within the politically 
sensitive content of a report to Canadian Corps 
Headquarters , wrote tha t "The infantry in some 
ins tances were exhaus ted with the resul ts tha t 
at t imes our bat ter ies were no [sic] suppor ted 
by them as well as I would like." But he added: 
"taking all c i rcumstances into consideration all 
h a s been done t h a t i s possible."3 1 Capta in 
Meurling in his Report on the lessons learned 
form the fighting was more forthright. 
The absolute lack of co-operation between not 
only the M/Gun service and the Infantry, but 
between infantry parties in the line compelled 
our guns to play their own game and co-ordinate 
wherever possible local systems of defense with 
M/Guns as natural strong-points 
Lack of men, lack of fire power - the infantry 
sometimes had rifles, sometimes not, but more 
often than not no ammunition - and lack of 
success in forming any organized line, compelled 
the guns to be worked for days and nights by 
only two men as a crew, in order that firepower 
of some sort maybe obtained at critical points.32 
The Canad ians were, however, consistently 
positive about the ready availability of supplies. 
In this task, the 3-ton lorries of the 2nd Canadian 
Ammunit ion Sub-Park provided by Currie had 
proved invaluable . 3 3 This was an indication of 
a fundamental Allied strength that would, in the 
end, be one of the factors tha t enabled their 
armies not only to s top the German offensives 
but to turn the tables on them and begin pushing 
them back in a retreat t ha t would culminate in 
the Armistice on 11 November. For example, in 
an action report of 26 March, Walker reported 
t ha t "I am in a position to draw plenty of new 
guns and belts etc." And in another of 29 March: 
"Supplies of new guns , tripods, spare par t s etc. 
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are plentiful."34 In his s u m m a r y written later, 
Meurl ingwas more effusive. 
Rations, New Guns, Spare Barrels and Parts 
were delivered daily to each Detachment. In no 
case were the men without food, Reinforcements 
were dispatched expeditiously to any part of the 
front. Ammunition was easily rushed to any 
Battery or section. Dumps were established and 
distributed in depth in case of retirement.35 
This was of no help to the British on 25 
March, however, when they lost the entire line 
of the River Somme between Ham and Peronne. 
As noted, the Germans h a d identified the most 
advantageous spots to cross and were advancing 
in hordes . Edmonds described the scene: "the 
divisions of the Fifth Army [were] now fighting 
and moving in small bodies, often composed of 
men of different uni t s , frequently with par t ies 
of Germans mixed up with them."36 
The un i t s of XIX Corps spen t the night of 
2 4 - 2 5 M a r c h p r e p a r i n g a c o u n t e r a t t a c k 
eas twards towards the Somme, scheduled for 
0815 hours the next morning which they hoped 
would drive the Germans back across the river. 
In preparat ion, Brigadier Haig's 24 th Brigade 
moved forward from Marchelepot to Licourt for 
the p lanned assaul t . Some four hou r s earlier, 
well in advance of the intended countera t tack, 
Major Battersby, with his four Autocars , p lus 
some motorcycl i s t s , h a d left 2 4 t h Brigade 
Headquar ters for Cizancourt on the west b a n k 
of the Canal to be in a posi t ion to provide 
advance support for the brigade's counterattack. 
The two cars unde r Lieutenants Smi th and 
Cuttle stopped beside a factory halfway between 
Licourt and Cizancourt and waited while the 
other two cars, under Battersby and Lieutenant 
Adams, pressed forward to Cizancourt and then 
s o u t h w a r d s a l o n g t h e C a n a l t o w a r d s 
Epenancourt, along the same road that Battersby 
had taken with some success the night before. 
But, as has been seen, when morning came, the 
Germans s t ruck first and the proposed British 
counterattack turned into a retreat. The men and 
cars of "A" Battery were left far forward without 
any infantry s u p p o r t as the enemy flooded 
around them and throughout the area. 
Sometime after daybreak a German aircraft 
o b s e r v e d S m i t h a n d C u t t l e ' s c a r s a n d 
communica ted their range to artillery un i t s , 
which soon brought them u n d e r intense fire. 
Smith moved ahead into a sunken road for better 
cover while Cuttle went as far forward as the 
outski r ts of Cizancourt . As par t ies of British 
infantry fled rearwards a round them, at last a 
motorcycle dispatch rider arrived from Battersby 
b e a r i n g o r d e r s for t h e m to move b a c k to 
Marchelepot. Smith remained in position a little 
while longer, however, to provide cover for some 
British infantry. His fire halted the advance of a 
p a r t y o f G e r m a n s m o v i n g d o w n a n old 
communications t rench before he was wounded 
in the ankle a n d decided it was time to leave. 
But as he was heading towards Licourt word 
came th rough tha t Marchelepot h a d already 
fallen. Consequently, instead of turn ing right at 
Licourt to proceed on to Marchelepot, he kept 
going directly through Licourt southwest to the 
village of Pertain and from there further west to 
the village of Omiecourt, where he halted. 
Meanwhile, Battersby and Adams h a d been 
forced back to Cizancourt , where they were 
reunited with Cuttle. Unable to tu rn around, the 
three cars were compelled to back down the road 
from Cizancourt to Licourt, their guns sputtering 
against the on rush ing German s torm troopers. 
Battersby's car h a d gone furthest in the early 
morn ing foray a n d w a s a t the h e a d of the 
procession, or closest to the enemy. Adams's car 
was next, with Cuttle's in the rear. They reached 
Licourt and followed the s ame route as h a d 
Smith earlier. It was as they were backing out of 
Licourt, down the road to Pertain when Battersby 
a n d h i s crew were killed. As desc r ibed by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Walker in a post-war account, 
an enemy shell exploded close to their car tha t 
either killed or wounded the driver causing it 
"to be suddenly ditched." (In fact, it would appear 
to have veered off the road into a field.) "Seeing 
its predicament," wrote Walker, "numbers of the 
enemy quickly closed in on the car and overcame 
t h e p e r s o n n e l wi th h a n d g r e n a d e s before 
ass is tance could arrive."37 
In the melee, Lieutenant Adams and his crew 
in the car behind ru shed forward in an a t tempt 
to give their stricken colleagues a tow. But enemy 
fire drove them offand they continued the retreat 
southwes t towards Pertain. Adams and Cuttle 
eventually made it th rough as far as Omiecourt 
where, sometime later, Lieutenant Smith found 
them. Adams was badly w o u n d e d from the 
a c t i o n a t L i c o u r t a n d t h e c a r w a s n o w 
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commanded by his subordinate, the aptly-
named Sergeant Vickers. Lieutenant Cuttle was 
also wounded , h i s car having been 
commandeered by a British brigadier to haul 
ammunition.38 
Adams's and Cuttle's cars must have only 
just disappeared down the road to Pertain when 
the German photographic crew showed up to 
take the three images shown here. Photograph 
No.l was taken the earliest, as the crew is still 
lying in the back. Only three bodies are visible, 
since those of Battersby and his driver would 
have been slumped down in the cab. Note the 
Lee-Enfield rifle positioned at the car's right 
front, which had been removed by the time 
photograph No.2 was taken. A German column 
is halted on the Licourt-Pertain road in the 
background, with a group of soldiers to the right 
examining the scene. It is impossible to tell 
whether the streaming ammunition belts and the 
helmets and ammunition boxes that litter the 
ground were caused by the explosions that 
accompanied the cars last moments or by some 
preliminary looting on the part of the Germans. 
Note that the boots of one of the dead Canadians 
have already been removed. 
Photograph No.2 was taken some time after 
photograph No. 1. By this time, the Germans had 
had the opportunity to indulge in more serious 
looting, a noted feature of their conduct during 
the spring offensives. Indeed, their shock as they 
advanced into the rear areas at discovering the 
huge stores of supplies possessed by the Allied 
a rmies , in compar i son to the i r own 
impoverished state, is sometimes cited as a root 
cause of their demoralization and ultimate 
failure.39 The car has been rummaged through 
and the body of the man whose leg is draped 
over the side in photograph No. 1 has been 
pulled out onto the ground, thoroughly 
ransacked and his boots removed. In addition, 
the Lee-Enfield rifle has been removed from its 
perch at the car's front. 
Photograph No.3 , t aken with the 
photographer standing in the cab and looking 
into the back, was probably shot last. By then, 
it would appear there was only one member of 
the dead crew left in the back, although it is 
difficult to be absolutely certain. Again his boots, 
as well as all web gear, are missing. 
Who, then, were these men? The records of 
the Commonwealth War Graves Commission 
indicate that five men serving with the 1 CMMGB 
were killed on 25 March, four of whom are 
memorialized on the Vimy Memorial, which 
indicates that their bodies were never found. The 
fifth is buried in the British Cemetery at Pargny 
on the Somme, only a few kms east of the scene 
of the action described above.40 These must be 
Battersby and his crew. That they numbered only 
four indicates that the crew were operating one 
short of the usual number, with only three 
working the machine guns.41 
Major William Falconer Battersby, MC, was 
thirty-six years old at the time of his death. He 
was born in Tavistock, Ontario, the son of Mr. 
and Mrs. A.C. Battersby. He was a mining and 
mechanical engineer by profession and had 
served in the 38th Dufferin Rifles before enlisting 
at Montreal on 16 January 1915 in the Borden 
Motor Machine Gun Battery. He landed in France 
with his unit on 15 September 1915 as a 
lieutenant and was gazetted with the Military 
Cross on 14 November 1916 for action in the 
first battle of the Somme. According to the 
citation "he fought and handled eight machine 
guns with great courage and skill, inflicting heavy 
casualties on two enemy field gun batteries."42 
He was promoted captain in November 1916 and 
major in January 1918, and, as has been seen, 
served as temporary commander of the 
1 CMMGB for a brief period in early 1918. After 
being replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, he 
remained the unit's second-in-command until 
his death. His body was never recovered and 
his name is commemorated on the Vimy 
Memorial.43 
Private Osmond John Culbert Begin was 
twenty-six years old at the time of his death, the 
son of Charles and Elizabeth Begin of 14 
Florence Street, Hamilton, Ontario. Having 
served in Hamilton's 13th Royal Regiment, he 
Opposite top: Photograph No.1 - The first photograph 
taken by the Germans soon after the action in which 
Battersby's car was blown off the road and its crew 
killed, (courtesy of Michel Gravel, Cornwall, ON) 
Opposite bottom: Photograph No.2 - The second German 
photograph taken sometime later than photograph 
No. 1, after German soldiers had time to indulge their 
penchant for looting, (courtesy of the Tank Museum, 
Bovington, Surrey, UK). 
58 
10
Canadian Military History, Vol. 11 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol11/iss3/5
11
Pulsifer: Death at Licourt
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2002
Photograph No.3 - The last of the three German photographs taken with the 
photographer standing in the car's cab and looking backwards along the rear. 
courtesy of the Tank Museur 
Bovington, Surrey, U 
re-enllsted on 10 September 1915 giving his 
profession as clerk. He arrived in England on 
29 May 1916 and after briefly serving as an 
acting lance-corporal, reverted to the rank of 
private at his own request. He was posted to the 
1CMMGB in France on 21 October 1916, and 
arrived there seven days later. On 24 April 1917, 
he was wounded in the arm and underwent 
medical treatment before rejoining his unit on 
24 May. The only black mark on his record was 
that, on 20 September 1917, he was sentenced 
to five days Field Pun i shment No. 1 for 
overstaying a leave from 12 midnight to 7:20 
the next morning while on active service. Begin's 
body was the only one recovered from 
Battersby's crew. He is buried in Plot 4, Row C, 
Grave 1, Pargny British Cemetery on the 
Somme.44 
Private Donald Douglas Brooks was twenty 
years old at his death, the son of A.H. and 
Margaret Brooks of Weymouth, Digby County, 
Nova Scotia. Giving his profession as bank clerk 
and with no previous military experience, he 
enlisted in the 64th Battalion at Sussex, New 
Brunswick on 19 August 1915. He arrived in 
England on 4 April 1916, and on 23 April was 
transferred to the Canadian Machine Gun 
Service at Shorncliffe. He joined the 1CMMGB 
in France on 14 September 1916. On 8 August 
1917, he was admitted to hospital suffering from 
the effects of an enemy gas attack and remained 
under care in hospital until returning to duty 
on 3 November.45 
Private Robert Walker Connell was born in 
Glasgow Scotland. Twenty-four years old at his 
death, he was the son of Mr. and Mrs. Frank 
Connell, then living in Toronto. Although he had 
no previous military experience, Connell was one 
of the most senior members of the unit, having 
joined the 1st Automobile Machine Gun Brigade 
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in Toronto on 24 August 1914. His civilian trade 
being a chauffeur, Connell served in the unit as 
a driver. He had a varied career overseas. On 18 
March 1915, he was admitted to hospital after 
being seriously injured in a motorcar accident 
in Kent. He nonetheless proceeded with his unit 
to France, but no sooner was he there than he 
was admitted to No. 12 General Hospital at 
Rouen suffering from gonorrhea, forfeiting his 
special 3rd class pay as a driver in the process. 
In December, he was posted to Headquarters, 
First Canadian Division, still as a driver since, 
on 27 January 1916, he was sentenced to "30 
days forfeiture of working pay for neglect of duty 
when in charge of a motor car." A number of 
other infractions followed, such as being subject 
to a stoppage of pay for the loss of a spoon and 
three days Field Punishment No. 1 for being 
absent without leave. Indeed, on 21 March 1917, 
he was struck off strength and returned to 
England to be discharged from the service. He 
evidently pulled himself together, however, for 
on 21 September 1917 he was in the Machine 
Gun Reinforcement Pool at Camiers in France. 
Taken onto the strength of the 1CMMGB on 25 
September, he was soon reinstated as a driver, 
with a working pay of 50 cents a day.46 
Sergeant Cyril Vidal, was twenty-five years 
old and was born in Lucea, Jamaica, his mother, 
Mrs. A. Vidal, still being resident there. (His 
records do not indicate whether he was black 
or white.) Having had no previous military 
experience and giving his profession as clerk, 
he enlisted in the 20th Battalion, Canadian 
Expeditionary Force at Toronto on 12 November 
1914. He arrived overseas in England on 15 May 
1915 and joined his unit in France on 12 
December. On 26 April he was wounded in the 
neck and back at the battle of St. Eloi and had 
to be evacuated to England. After his discharge, 
he was posted to the Canadian Machine Gun 
Depot at Crowborough on 27 September and 
promoted lance-corporal on 6 January 1917. 
He was soon reduced to the ranks, however, and 
subjected to six days Field Punishment No. 2 
for being absent without leave for a total of five 
and a half days. He also spent a spell in hospital 
suffering from venereal disease but he arrived 
back in France on 12 April 1917 and transferred 
to the 1CMMGB on 22 April. Here he proved 
resourceful enough to be appointed acting 
corporal in September and promoted sergeant 
on 11 January 1918. One can presume he was 
in charge of the machine gunners in Battersby's 
car on 25 March.47 
A relatively 'unscientific' survey of this small 
group of men suggests that they were somewhat 
younger than average in die CEF, at least amongst 
those who had seen as much service, as the 
average age on enlistment for the CEF as a whole 
was 26.3 years. They also differed somewhat 
from the norm in that three, or 60 per cent, were 
Canadian-born, whereas the figures of native 
born Canadians in the CEF as a whole was never 
more than 51.2 per cent. They certainly did not 
meet the s t anda rd Brit ish stereotype of 
Canadians as mostly farmers, lumberjacks, or 
cowboys, as they were largely of urban rather 
than rural backgrounds. They were also slightly 
more educated or skilled than average, as one 
had been an engineer, three were clerks, and one 
a chauffer, in their pre-war days.48 Three had 
incurred their share of military infractions. Two 
had suffered the consequences, both physical 
and disciplinary, of sex-related disease, the 
average for the latter in the CEF as a whole, 
according to figures compiled by Desmond 
Morton, being one in nine.49 The average length 
of their full military careers, including service 
in Canada, in England, and at the front, was 
three years, one month; their average length of 
service at the front two years, one month. Three 
of them had previously spent time in hospital 
from wounds, one in the arm, the second in the 
back and neck, and the third in a gas attack. 
Their length of service, the number of wounds 
and other experiences suggest that these five 
soldiers were by and large a hardened group of 
Canadian front fighters, such as Canada has 
never before or afterwards seen in any of its wars 
and military campaigns. Having been in and out 
of action at the front for more than two years, 
their reward at the end was to be killed by 
German artillery or hand grenades. 
The battle in front of Amiens continued to 
rage for six more days after deaths of Battersby 
and his crew. The Germans made repeated 
attempts to break through and capture this 
important communications hub. They came to 
within a kilometre of Villers Bretonneux by the 
time their exhausted and frustrated troops 
stopped on 31 March. Throughout this period 
the batteries of the 1CMMGB were constantly 
engaged, rushing from spot to spot to fire on 
parties of advancing storm troopers and adding 
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their support to hastily prepared lines of defence. 
The enemy's halt on 31 March at last gave them 
a chance to rest after days of almost constant 
action and nights without sleep. The crews of 
1CMMGB continued to patrol throughout these 
days and took more casualties, but the fighting 
seemed to be winding down. On 4 April, however, 
the German commander, General Ludendorff, 
made one last effort to break through to Amiens 
and the Canadian machine gunners were 
ordered to assist the British in holding Villers 
Bretonneux "at all costs." 
Having been involved in intense action for 
nearly two weeks, their cars riddled with dents 
and holes from German bullets and armour-
piercing shells, the stress levels in the unit can 
be well imagined. Indeed, Alex Lynch, in an 
account of the unit's role in the March Offensive 
that is based upon the testimony of his father, 
Vincent Lynch, a lieutenant with the Yukon 
Battery, records that when they received the news 
from Walker that they were go back into the line, 
the members "reacted with violence" and were 
on the "point of mutiny." Their nerves were so 
completely shot, writes Lynch, that they "would 
break into tears at the slightest frustration such 
as someone sitting on their bed." Lieutenant 
Lynch, who clearly detested Walker, risked court 
martial by refusing to take any more orders from 
him and only a visit by Brutinel himself managed 
to calm the situation and convince the men to 
return to the fighting.50 They did return and 
suffered four more killed and another 26 
wounded before this last German offensive in 
the area was beaten off. Only on 10 April were 
they at last able to depart the Somme and return 
to rejoin their compatriots at Vimy.51 Total 
casualties during their 15 days on the Somme 
were 25 killed, 108 wounded, and 11 missing 
out of an original strength of about 330.52 
The 1CMMGB experienced a furious period 
of action and paid a heavy price in deaths and 
injuries. British and French "backs to the wall" 
attitude on one side and German miscalculations 
at the command level and exhaustion in the field 
on the other had brought the German "Michael" 
offensive to a standstill. Yet for a time, British 
Fifth Army was near collapse and the mobile fire-
power that the 1CMMGB brought to the scene 
doubtless helped them through a period of great 
difficulty, although a detailed historical appraisal 
of the unit's contribution has yet to be written. 
In a report dated 1 April 1918, which indicates 
that the 1CMMGB was responsible for its own 
sha r e of kill ing, Hamil ton Fyfe, war 
correspondent of the British newspaper, the 
Daily Mirror, w r o t e : 
When the full story is told of the encounter of 
giant forces and of die successful withdrawal of 
the British Army in the face of immensely 
superior German strength, a very glowing page 
of it will have to be devoted to the splendidly 
gallant and useful part played by the Canadian 
motor machine guns. The other day [ie. 25 
March]..., I saw some of their grey armoured 
cars come tearing down the road in clouds of 
dust evidently going into action hot foot. A little 
later I heard a tremendous tap, tap, tapping and 
knew they were engaged. They held up the 
German advance there as they did in a number 
of other places....Everywhere they went they 
steadied the line. They gave the Infantry fresh 
hope and courage. 
The total n u m b e r of Germans killed and 
disabled by them here and elsewhere must be 
very large. Indeed, nothing could have been more 
successful than the first appearance in action of 
this vastly useful unit. One more reason for the 
Dominion to be proud of her citizen soldiers. 
They saved many a situation from developing 
dangerously and they killed a tremendous lot of 
Boches. Both our troops and the French speak 
of them with the highest admirat ion and 
gratitude.53 
Yet their contribution has, for the most part, 
been forgotten. The role of the Canadian Motors 
is not mentioned at all in General Gough's self-
justifying memoir, The March Retreat, and all 
but neglected in Edmonds's British official 
history and other historical accounts of the 
battle. As is perhaps to be expected, G.W.L. 
Nicholson in the Canadian official history does 
them the most justice in stating that their 
contribution was "far out of proportion to such 
a comparatively small unit" (although this still 
seems somewhat restrained).54 Machine guns 
were, of course, much needed by the British in 
their March retreat because so many had been 
lost in the initial German attacks. Nonetheless, 
Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs that "machine 
gun posts had given us an undue amount of 
trouble and so caused delay." "Tiny" Walker's 
own modest assessment was that if his own 
unit's machine guns shared any responsibility 
for these delays "its visit to the Fifth Army was 
not in vain. "ss 
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The photographs around which this article 
focuses serve as stark testimony to the services 
of the Canadian motor machine gunners during 
these tumultuous days on the Western Front. 
Taken by German photographers, doubtless with 
propaganda purposes in mind, only moments 
after the soldiers had met their deaths, they 
convey a sense of the stress and furor of the 
fighting that these five Canadians endured. The 
photographs can serve beside the four names 
on the Vimy Memorial at Arras and the 
gravestone in Pargny Cemetery as an additional 
memorial to this group, who, in displaying such 
fortitude in carrying out their duties in this 
desperate moment for the Allied side on the 
western front, ultimately lost their lives. Their 
story now forms part of the documented, the 
commemorative, as well as the visual record of 
Canada's part in the "Great" War. 
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